Media publisher platforms often face an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff: more annoying ads can be more effective for some advertisers because of their ability to attract attention, but after attracting viewers' attention, their nuisance to viewers can decrease engagement with the platform over time. With the rise of mobile technology and ad blockers, many platforms are becoming increasingly concerned about how to improve monetization through digital ads while improving viewer experience.
INTRODUCTION
Digital display ads can sometimes be a nuisance to viewers. Publisher platforms, which charge to place ads on webpages, have a vested interest in limiting negative ad impact on viewer experience because it jeopardizes their long-term ability to deliver an engaged audience to advertisers (Wilbur, Xu, and Kempe 2013) . When estimating the advertising elasticity of demand for TV, Wilbur et al. (2008) find that a 10% increase in advertising time leads to a 25% reduction in audience size for a popular broadcast network. Goldstein et al. (2014) experimentally measure a platform's economic costs of serving annoying display ads to viewers, and find that these costs seem to exceed the typical price that digital platforms charge to advertisers.
Despite their negative impact on viewer experience, distracting or annoying ads tend to be noticed more and thus can be more valuable to some advertisers. Ads that elicit more extreme, even negative, reactions can sometimes be more effective than neutral ones because they attract attention, facilitate memory for the advertised brand, and may even enhance persuasion if their distraction inhibits counterarguing (Aaker and Bruzonne 1985 , Moore and Hutchinson 1983 , Silk and Vavra 1974 . As an example, more irritating television commercials are better remembered and more likely to be recognized (Aaker and Bruzzone 1985) . Similarly, online gamers have explicit memory for ads that they find annoying (Yeu et al. 2013) . More recently, Zhou et al. (2016) examined ads from Yahoo's mobile news stream. The quartile of ads with the highest click-through rates had the highest proportion of highly offensive ads.
We use the term ad annoyance to refer to the degree to which an ad irritates viewers. Aaker and Bruzzone (1985) describe annoying ads as "provoking, causing displeasure and momentary impatience." Annoying ads create an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff : they may be more effective for some advertisers, but they are a nuisance for viewers. This tradeoff challenges media platforms that thrive on advertising, because some advertisers may be willing to pay more to show more annoying ads. For example, Wall Street analyst Richard Greenfield noted that "while larger/more prominent ads clearly detract from the Facebook user experience, we believe they come with higher CPMs and should help re-accelerate revenues" (Booton 2012). For mobile platforms such as smart phones and tablets, the stakes are higher because smaller screens and lower bandwidths make it difficult to show effective ads, and viewers are less tolerant of annoyance. The proliferation of ad blockers, which pose an even greater threat to platform profits, is also growing as consumers become less tolerant of annoying ads.
A platform can partially manage the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff by limiting annoyance through factors directly under its control, such as ad format or the number of ads on a page.
In 2013, Google reduced the ad load on mobile search by more than 50%. Although this substantially reduced revenue in the short term, the improved viewer experience led to an increase of up to 4% in user click-through rates within ten weeks (Hohnhold, O'Brien, and Tang 2015) .
However, ad characteristics that the platform does not directly control, such as ad images and text, also strongly determine differences in annoyance between ads. This paper focuses on how platforms can limit ad annoyance that is driven by ad characteristics under advertiser control. Based on data from Yahoo's ad feedback tool, characteristics that determine ad annoyance include how easy it is to read and understand ad text, how reliable users deem information in the ad to be, symmetry, and aesthetic appeal (Zhou et al. 2016) .
Currently, most display advertising platforms use prohibitions to control ad annoyance.
Leading platforms prohibit ads containing violent or offensive subject matter, containing animations that last more than some number of seconds, and so forth. Unfortunately, under prohibitions, ads will tend to the allowed limits of annoyance if annoyance is associated with effectiveness. Also, prohibitions can be difficult to enforce, because some platforms have limited control over ad content (Lambrecht et al. 2014 ).
Instead of prohibitions, if advertisers internalize the costs of ad annoyance through a "tax" for negative ad impact on viewer experience, then advertisers have an incentive to develop ads that are less annoying as well as more effective. Abrams and Schwarz (2008) proposed an auction that charges advertisers for their ads' impact on viewer experience. The charges are like Pigovian taxes (Pigou 1912) , because advertisers internalize the negative externalities imposed by their ads. We refer to this pricing mechanism, applied to a single display ad slot, as the Pigovian second price auction (PSP).
First, PSP subtracts from each advertiser's bid a charge for the (estimated) reduction in long-term revenue to the platform that would be caused by showing their ad. Next the mechanism conducts an auction based on the adjusted bids. The winner is allocated ad space and pays the adjusted-bid auction price plus the charge for the ad's impact on user experience.
Compared to the straightforward second-price auction (SP), PSP increases the sum of platform revenue and advertiser profit (Abrams and Schwarz 2008) . However, when ad effectiveness and nuisance are positively associated, a scenario not explicitly considered by Abrams and Schwartz, PSP may increase platform revenue while decreasing advertiser profit.
In other words, the distribution of profits can be skewed. If switching to PSP lowers expected profits for advertisers, then the platform may suffer in the long term, because advertisers may shift more of their business to other platforms. This paper shows that switching from a second-price auction to PSP can simultaneously improve revenue for advertisers and the platform while improving viewer experience, under certain marketplace conditions. We show that the bid adjustment for ad impact on user experience in PSP can benefit advertisers by increasing dispersion among advertiser bids, so that in PSP the difference between the winning and runner-up adjusted bids is greater on average than the difference between the winning and runner-up bids from SP. These gaps are the winning advertiser's profits under PSP and SP, respectively. Simultaneously, viewers benefit from a more enjoyable experience, and that enables the platform to benefit from an increase in future revenue by improving future audience engagement.
A previous paper, by Balachander et al. (2009) , also uses a change in dispersion among bids to show that a change in auction mechanisms tends to change advertiser prices. That paper examines a change in second-price auction mechanism from ranking and pricing by bid times clickthrough rate to ranking and pricing strictly by bid. They show that bids tend to have less dispersion than bid times clickthrough rates, under the assumption that bids and clickthrough rates are correlated. Thus, second prices tend to be closer to first prices, increasing profit for the platform by decreasing profit for advertisers. In contrast, this paper examines changing the second-price auction mechanism to incorporate a charge for ad impact on user experience. We show that this change can benefit the platform and advertisers simultaneously. While the platform benefits from an increase in future revenue by offering users a more engaging experience, advertiser profits increase because bids adjusted for ad impact on user experience have more dispersion than bids alone.
Since the relationship between bids and bids adjusted for ad impact on user experience depends on the strength of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, we explicitly model the tradeoff to study how it impacts profitability for both advertisers and the platform. We model the strength of the tradeoff by allowing the "hidden cost" of ad annoyance to be associated with an advertiser's willingness to pay for a slot. A positive association reflects that more annoying ads tend to provide a higher value to advertisers. We then apply the model to show that even in the presence of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, a platform can impose a charge for annoying ads without compromising the profits earned for itself or by its winning advertisers.
A key finding is that a higher number of advertisers competing for ad space makes it more likely that the platform can sustainably charge for ad annoyance (i.e., without compromising advertiser profits or platform revenues). We derive a formula that relates the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff to the minimum number of advertisers needed for PSP to benefit viewers, advertisers, and the platform. The formula shows that even platforms facing a strong effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff can sustainably implement PSP if they can attract enough advertisers. This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the payoffs to each party under auction mechanisms with and without a Pigovian charge for ad impact on viewer experience. Section 3 presents a theorem showing that advertisers can benefit from the Pigovian charge if they are numerous enough. Section 4 develops a model for the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff and illustrates the theorem with two examples of joint distributions for ad effectiveness and nuisance. Section 5 shows that when PSP improves advertiser profits, it also simultaneously benefits viewers and platform profits. Section 6 analyzes the case in which ad annoyance and effectiveness are negatively associated instead of positively associated. Section 7 explores how strategic advertisers choose ads based on auction type and how ad choice affects the results from previous sections. Finally, Section 8 concludes and proposes directions for future work.
AUCTION MECHANISMS
This section describes the payoffs for the second-price auction (SP) and the Pigovian second-price (PSP) auction. These descriptions remove some complexity found in actual auctions for online display ads, such as reserve prices. The bids here are per-impression bids.
In SP, advertisers are ranked by their bids. Let n be the number of bidders, and let b 1 , ..., b n be their bids. Let w be the index of the highest bid, and let s be the index of the second-highest bid. SP allocates the advertising opportunity to advertiser w and charges this winner the second price: b s .
PSP incorporates measures of the hidden costs of ad annoyance into the pricing and selection rules. Let z 1 , ..., z n be measures of the hidden costs imposed on the platform by showing the ad creatives associated with bids b 1 , ..., b n . We assume that z i is known to both advertiser i and the platform.
In practice, platforms can estimate z i through a combination of experimentation and predictive models of how viewership changes over time as a function of ad features, viewer engagement metrics, and editorial assessment. See Goldstein et al. (2014) for an example on how hidden costs (i.e., a platform's economic costs of serving annoying display ads to viewers) can be experimentally measured. Similarly, Hohnhold, O'Brien and Tang (2015) developed a model to predict long-term user behavior based on short-term user satisfaction metrics. Platforms, such as Yahoo, Hulu, Facebook and Twitter, often monitor ad impact on user experience through a variety of methods, including text links that collect ad feedback from users on the relevance and attractiveness of ads (Rohrer and Boyd 2004) .
The PSP mechanism first adjusts offers by subtracting each ad's annoyance costs from its bid: b 1 − z 1 , ..., b n − z n . Then it holds a second-price auction using the adjusted offers. Any advertiser who has a negative valuation for showing their ad, v i < 0, does not enter a bid in SP, because if they did, then they would risk negative utility should they win and receive zero utility if they lose. If an advertiser's adjusted bid is negative, v i − z i < 0, then PSP removes its adjusted bid from the auction. Define r(x 1 , x 2 ) = max(x 1 , 0) − max(x 2 , 0).
Then the profit for the winning advertiser in SP is r(v w , v s ), and the profit for the winning advertiser in PSP (which may not be the same winner as for SP) is r (aw, as) . This is because if aw > 0 and as > 0, then the PSP winner is charged as + zw, leaving a profit of We conclude this section with a simple example that builds intuition on how PSP can simultaneously benefit viewers, the platform, and its advertisers. Consider ten advertisers with valuations (v 1 , . . . , v 10 ) = (6. 04, 5.57, 5.13, 5.11, 4.51, 4.50, 4.39, 4.07, 3.24, 3.02) Figure 1 , the respective winner and runner-up are advertisers one and two for SP, and advertisers six and one for PSP. The data for this example was generated at random using a model we will discuss in detail in the next section. The values v i were drawn i.i.d. from a normal distribution with mean five and standard deviation 1. The ad impacts on user experience z i were generated by adding a quarter of v i to half of a value drawn i.i.d. from a normal distribution with mean two and standard deviation 2. The first term reflects an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, and the second term reflects random variation in ad impact on user experience over ads and advertisers. For ease of illustration, advertisers are ordered by their bids v i . Viewers, the advertisers as a group, and the platform simultaneously benefit from PSP in this example. First, note that PSP clearly improves viewer experience: z 6 > z 1 . The winning ad under SP (advertiser 1) has such a negative impact on user experience that showing it will eventually decrease views enough for the publisher to lose z 1 = 2.20. In contrast, the winning ad (advertiser 6) under PSP has a positive impact on user experience: z 6 = −0.09. Second, the profits for the platform are also greater for PSP: a 1 > v 2 − z 1 . For SP, the platform receives the second price v 2 = 5.57 in immediate revenue from the winning advertiser, but incurs a z 1 = 2.20 eventual reduction in revenue due to the winning ad's impact on user experience. Thus, the total platform revenue from SP is 5.57 − 2.20 = 3.37.
For PSP, the platform receives from the winning advertiser the runner-up adjusted bid of a 1 = 3.84 minus a bonus of z 6 = −0.09 for the winning ad's positive impact on user experience.
The platform eventually recovers the 0.09 because the positive ad experience drives more views and hence more revenue in the future. Thus, total platform revenue for PSP is 3.84.
Third, the winning advertiser for PSP is more profitable than the winning advertiser for SP. Notice that for both auctions, the winning advertiser's profit is the difference between the highest and second-highest values from a distribution: for SP, the distribution of offers v i ; for PSP, the distribution of adjusted offers v i − z i . In this example, the difference between the top two bids is 6.04 − 5.57 = 0.47, while the difference between the top two adjusted bids is 4.59 − 3.84 = 0.75.
The next section formally shows when PSP leads to greater advertiser profits than SP.
Notice from Figure 1 that in this example, adjusted bids are more dispersed than bids. This greater variance in the distribution of adjusted bids is driven by random variation in ad impact on user experience z i . A consequence of this dispersion is that PSP adjusted bids tend to have larger differences between their top two adjusted bids than between the top two SP bids. If this occurs, then advertiser profit for PSP is greater than for SP, if the runner-up adjusted bid is also nonnegative. Notice also from Figure 1 that the distribution of adjusted bids is shifted left from the distribution of bids. This occurs if viewing ads is, on average over ads, a negative experience for viewers.
An advertiser may have an adjusted bid greater than their bid (i.e., a 6 > v 6 ) if their ad has such a positive impact on user experience that it increases views for the publisher. These attractive ads are more likely to be shown under PSP than under SP. It is also possible for an advertiser with a positive bid v i to have a negative adjusted bid. PSP excludes these advertisers, because their bid does not cover the eventual cost to the publisher in reduced views from showing the ad. In short, the Pigovian charge drives these ads out of the auction.
A THEOREM ON ADVERTISER PROFITS
This section compares total expected profits for advertisers under each auction. The auctions may have different winning advertisers, but in both cases the advertiser profit accrues to the winner. Recall from Table 2 that advertiser profit equals the difference between the top two offers under SP, and the difference between the top two adjusted offers under PSP. Also recall that r(x 1 , x 2 ) = max(x 1 , 0) − max(x 2 , 0). Switching from SP to PSP increases the expected profits for advertisers as a class when:
In this section, we derive a theorem by comparing these expected profits for a general set of distributions for bids v i and for adjusted bids a i = v i − z i . In the next section, we illustrate the theorem using two examples of specific distributions. Let f be the pdf of bids v i , and let F be the cdf. Then the advertiser surplus for SP can be written: 
To analyze advertiser surplus for PSP, let g be the pdf of adjusted bids a i = v i − z i and let G be the cdf. The expected advertiser surplus can be approximated:
2 Our proof does not rely on this approximation; we use it only to simplify this explanation.
Equations 4 for PSP. Consider the following approximation to Inequality 2 :
Since F is a cdf, the area under the pdf f from F
Equivalently, after dividing the support of f into n + 1 segments, each covered by 1 n+1 of the area under f , advertiser surplus is the distance covered by the second-to-last segment.
Similarly, the area under g from G
. These are illustrated as areas "A" and "B" in Figure 2 for two hypothetical distributions g and f . ), when the pdf f is higher over B than the height of g over A, the length of the base (i.e., advertiser surplus) must be larger for A than for B, making PSP more profitable than SP. In summary, if the second-to-last segment supporting 1 n+1 of the area under g covers more distance than the second-to-last segment supporting 1 n+1 of the area under f , then PSP is favorable for advertisers. Equivalently, a lower right tail in g than in f makes PSP favorable, given sufficient numbers of competing
), and G −1 (
) out in the right tails of f and g. We call this the dispersion condition.
The dispersion condition is less likely to hold when there is a strong effectiveness-nuisance 
Theorem 1 Let SP bids v i have a continuous pdf f and cdf F . Let PSP adjusted bids
profits from PSP is greater than that for SP:
Now we briefly discuss the long-term implications of implementing PSP, which are discussed in more detail in Section 7. Since Theorem 1 imposes minimal assumptions on the joint distribution of advertiser valuations v i and nuisance costs z i , it can be applied to evaluate scenarios in which this joint distribution is expected to change. The effectivenessnuisance tradeoff in the marketplace (which determines the joint distribution) is not expected to remain constant over time, but can instead decrease in magnitude because PSP provides advertisers with incentives to invest in developing ads that are effective without being as annoying. As advertisers adapt to PSP in the long run, the strength of the tradeoff should diminish, making the dispersion condition more likely to hold. Visually, when the correlation between v i and z i decreases, advertiser profits under PSP (i.e., the base of area A in Figure   2 ) increase because the right tail of g becomes lower while the area over A still equals
To summarize, since PSP provides advertisers with incentives to develop better ads, advertiser profits under PSP are expected to increase over time. Nevertheless, the platform must ensure that initially (for the given current level of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff) PSP can benefit its advertisers relative to SP, since platforms compete with each other for advertisers. Thus, the next section analyzes the implications of implementing PSP for a given level of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff.
A MODEL FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS-NUISANCE TRADEOFF
To illustrate Theorem 1, we apply it to a marketplace with an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff in which advertisers with higher bids also tend to be those with ads that are more annoying. Let an ad's hidden costs of annoyance z i be a weighted function of scaled bids (c ≥ 0) and an independent random variable y i :
The weight θ ∈ (0, 1), which controls the positive association between v i and z i , is a measure of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff present in the marketplace. As θ approaches 1, advertisers with the highest bids tend to have ads with the most annoyance. As θ approaches zero, v i and z i become independent, so the tradeoff is not present.
Under this model, the distributions for v i and y i jointly define f (the pdf of bids) and g (the pdf of adjusted bids). Note that adjusted bids under this model equal
Next we apply Theorem 1 to two examples of this model. In Example 1, both v i and y i are uniformly distributed. In Example 2, both are normally distributed.
Example 1: v i and y i uniformly distributed
If both v i and y i have uniform distributions over the interval from zero to one, then the area under f is a square with height one over [0, 1] , and the area under g is a trapezoid, as shown in Figure 3 . It is the convolution of two uniform distributions. The maximum height of the trapezoid is
, which is greater than one.
If the second-highest adjusted bid is far enough along the right side of the trapezoid that g(as) ≤ 1, then PSP is favorable to SP for advertisers as a class. Visually, where the height of the uniform f is larger than the height of the trapezoid g over the two largest adjusted bids, the difference between the two largest adjusted bids must be larger in expectation than the difference between the two largest bids. Equivalently, if g(x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ [as, aw], then g(x) ≤ f (x) over this domain, making PSP favorable to SP. In this example, bids have a uniform distribution f in the shape of a square with a height equal to 1, while adjusted bids have a distribution g in the shape of a trapezoid (with a height greater than 1). If few advertisers participate, then it is likely that the top two adjusted bids are near the middle of the trapezoid (where the height of g is greater than 1). As more advertisers participate, the top two adjusted bids are more likely to fall further out into the right tail of the trapezoid, where the height of the pdf g is less than one (i.e., the zone in which PSP leads to greater advertiser profits than SP).
Next we calculate how many participating advertisers n are needed at a minimum for the expected second-highest adjusted bid to be far enough along the right side of the trapezoid so that g(as) ≤ 1. Using the approximation from Equation 5, this condition is approximately the same as
To solve for n, note that s * = (1 − cθ)θ is the point at which g(s * ) = 1. The above inequality holds when
The area under g from s * to the right end of the distribution can be written as 1-G(s * ).
This area is a triangle of height 1 and length (1
To find approximately how many advertisers are needed for PSP to be favorable to SP for advertisers as a class, set this equal to n−1 n+1
and solve for n:
This lower bound increases as the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff increases (as θ → 1). As θ → 1, the sides of the trapezoid become steeper and cover less horizontal distance, making the trapezoid resemble a rectangle. The next example calculates a lower bound for n when v i and y i are normally distributed.
Example 2: v i and y i normally distributed
Let v i and y i be normally distributed as shown in Equations 10 and 11.
Then the distribution of bids f is normal (Equation 10), and the distribution of adjusted bids g is also normal, with mean
y . These two distributions are positively associated through the weight θ, which controls the strength of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff.
Using the normal model, we first show that Theorem 1 is satisfied byû = G(0) when the distribution of adjusted bids is more dispersed than the distribution of bids: σ a > σ v . Then we useû = G(0) to estimate a lower bound on the number of advertisers needed for PSP to benefit advertisers as a class when σ a > σ v . We conclude by explaining how the magnitude of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff parameter θ affects the condition σ a > σ v .
Theorem 1 is satisfied byû
Theorem 1 requiresû such that 1. ∀u ≥û :
For the first condition, recall that any normal distribution cdf can be written in terms of the standard normal cdf Φ. For example,
Set u = F (x) and F −1 (u) = x. Then solve for F −1 (u):
Recall that the pdf for a normal variable with mean µ v and standard deviation σ v is
Substitute x = F −1 (u) and Equation 12 into Equation 13:
Similarly,
As a result, g(G −1 (u)) < f (F −1 (u)) if and only if σ a > σ v , and this holds for all u ∈ (0, 1).
To meet the second condition, G −1 (û) ≥ 0, setû = G(0). This also satisfies the third , the number of advertisers needed is about n such that
Since G is the cdf of a normal distribution with mean µ a and standard deviation σ a ,
). So the number of advertisers required is about
We can use the standard normal cdf, with In this case, the charge for ad annoyance makes average adjusted bids negative, but the standard deviation of adjusted bids makes the probability of each bid being nonnegative about 16% (i.e., the probability of a standard normal being at least one standard deviation above its mean). For can reduce the number of advertisers that are interested for a slot. Our findings suggest that platforms should implement the Pigovian tax for competitive ad slots that consistently attract a large group of bidders, rather than for ad slots with thinner markets.
The role of effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff parameter θ
Since σ
y , the inequality σ a > σ v , needed to satisfy Theorem 1, holds when
As θ approaches its upper limit, Inequality 14 does not hold, because setting θ = 1 makes the denominator zero. Thus, PSP will not benefit advertisers when the costs of annoyance are directly proportional to effectiveness: z i = cv i . The inequality holds when there is no tradeoff, because setting θ = 0 makes the numerator equal to zero. 
VIEWER EXPERIENCE AND PLATFORM PROFIT
This section shows how PSP benefits the platform and viewers. The platform operates in a two-sided market: it offers content to attract viewers, and it offers advertisers an opportunity to advertise to the audience. The platform must ensure that a switch to PSP benefits the entire marketplace: advertiser profits (discussed in previous sections), viewer experience, and platform profits.
Viewer experience
PSP is designed to improve viewer welfare because it selects advertisements that lead to a better viewer experience. PSP improves (or at least preserves) viewer experience on an auction-by-auction basis (Theorem 2), and it decreases the expected costs of ad annoyance (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2. Switching from SP to PSP improves (or at least preserves) viewer experience by reducing the costs of ad annoyance: zw
Proof. By the definition ofw, v w − z w ≤ vw − zw, which implies zw
By the definition of w, v w ≥ vw. Hence the term in parenthesis is positive, proving that z w ≥ zw.
Theorem 3. If ad annoyance costs to the platform are not perfectly correlated with advertiser valuations (θ < 1), then switching from SP to PSP decreases the hidden costs of ad annoyance in expectation:
E{zw} < E{z w }.
Proof. From Theorem 2, zw ≤ z w . Thus we only need to show that P r{zw = z w } < 1.
Since z i are drawn i.i.d. from some continuous distribution, z i values for different advertisers i have a zero probability of being equal: P r{z i = z j } = 0 ∀i = j. Hence, we only need to show that the auctions sometimes pick different winners: P r{w = w} < 1, or equivalently, P r{w = w} > 0, which is true when v i and z i are not perfectly correlated.
Platform profits
Recall from Table 2 that the platform's profits from SP are v s − z w and from PSP are vs −zs. PSP leads to greater profits because it allows the platform to select better ads and to charge advertisers for annoyance costs. In other words, it selects ads based on total revenue for the platform v i − z i , while SP selects ads only based on bids v i .
Two extreme cases of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, θ = 1 and θ = 0, provide further intuition. If θ = 1, the most annoying ads are also the most effective, and v i and z i are perfectly correlated. To illustrate, suppose that z i = cv i for a constant c≥ 0. Both auctions produce the same ranking of advertiser offers, but the platform's profits are greater under PSP because it charges the winner a premium for its ad's impact on user experience.
When there is no effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff (θ = 0), then z i and v i are independent.
In this case, PSP also improves platform profits because the runner up in PSP is likely to have both a high private value v i and low annoyance z i . As the number of bidding advertisers increases to infinity, the runner up almost surely has one of the highest private values for the slot and one of the least annoying ads. Consequently, PSP is likely to reduce annoyance costs while maintaining a high ad price.
The following theorem states that PSP produces at least as much expected revenue for the platform as SP.
Theorem 4. Switching from SP to PSP is expected to improve (or at least preserve)
platform profits: ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], c ≥ 0, and n ≥ 3, E{vs − zs} ≥ E{v s − z w }.
See Appendix B for the formal proof. The theorem focuses on the normal distribution example, but it is easy to see that it also applies to the uniform distribution example and to other symmetric distributions. The theorem assumes two or more nonnegative bids and adjusted bids. If there is only one positive bid, then SP platform revenue is −z w , because it incurs the ad impact on user experience and shows the ad for no charge. If there is only one positive adjusted bid, then PSP platform revenue is zero, because it charges only for the ad impact on user experience.
This section has shown that when there is an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, PSP generally improves platform profits and viewer experience. Previous sections showed that advertisers only benefit from PSP if enough of them participate in the auction. So, in general, PSP can simultaneously benefit the marketplace (viewer experience, advertiser profit, and platform profit) when advertisers benefit as a class.
ATTRACTIVE ADS
Thus far, we have compared PSP to SP for models with an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff in which ads tend to have annoyance associated with the value to the advertiser to show the ad. But this need not be the case. Some platforms may not face the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff and may instead observe that advertisers with more attractive ads tend to have a higher willingness to pay.
This section considers the case in which annoyance is negatively associated with value.
In this section, we will use the term attractiveness to mean the opposite of annoyance:
attractiveness equals −z i , and we will say that an ad is attractive if −z i > 0, (i.e., if the ad increases future views for the platform instead of imposing hidden nuisance costs).
The next two subsections show that under these circumstances PSP can also benefit both advertisers and the platform, because it selects ads that are both attractive and effective.
The exception is the extreme case in which attractiveness and willingness-to-pay are perfectly (or very highly) correlated: then SP and PSP both select the most attractive ad, but the same advertiser is compensated more under PSP for the ad's attractiveness. 
Advertisers benefit from attractive ads
with
The term θ now controls the association between ad attractiveness and value. Recall that adjusted bids are a i = v i − z i , so the mean and variance of the distribution of adjusted bids are
and 
Platform profits and attractive ads
Now consider whether the platform benefits from PSP if ad attractiveness (−z i ) is positively associated with the value to the advertiser for showing the ad (v i ). Under SP the platform benefits from the attractiveness of the winning ad without compensating the advertiser for it. Under PSP, though, the platform compensates the winning advertiser for the difference in attractiveness between the winning ad and the runner-up ad.
In the extreme case that attractiveness and value are perfectly correlated, PSP harms platform profit because it selects the same attractive ad but compensates the advertiser for its attractiveness. In this case,s = s, so platform profit under PSP equals SP platform profit minus the difference in attractiveness between the top two ads (recall Table 2 ):
However, if attractiveness is not directly proportional to value (i.e., the most highlyvalued ad need not be the most attractive), then PSP can benefit the platform because it may select an ad that offers the publisher a greater sum of bid value and attractiveness than the ad selected by SP. We illustrate this using the normal model from Section 4.2, with the change in sign for z i to have attractiveness (instead of annoyance) associated with value (Equation 16). Specifically, we find an approximate condition for PSP to provide the platform with greater expected profits than SP: E {vs − zs} > E {v s − z w }.
First some notation. Let E N (µ, σ 2 ) (k,n) be the expected value of the kth greatest value among n i.i.d. draws from the distribution N (µ, σ 2 ). Then, PSP platform profit is
Since −z w = θcv w + (1 − θ)y w , and y w is independent of the ranking by bid to select w, the
To approximate this inequality, approximate each expectation of an order statistic by the inverse cdf of the expected cdf value, which is n−k+1 n+1
for the kth order statistic out of n samples (David and Nagaraja 2003). For our normal distributions, this approximation is shown in Equation 23.
Under this approximation, the inequality becomes
Cancel (1 + cθ)µ v + (1 − θ)µ y from both sides and combine terms:
For 0 < θ < 1, the inequality holds if σ y is sufficiently large:
As previously discussed, in the extreme case when θ = 1 (attractiveness is directly propor-tional to value) the inequality does not hold. When attractiveness is independent of value (θ = 0) the inequality holds for any σ y > 0:
STRATEGIC ADVERTISERS
Advertisers tend to have multiple ads available to submit to online advertising auctions.
In this section, we consider how advertisers' ability to choose an ad to submit based on whether the auction mechanism is SP or PSP affects the results from the previous sections.
Allowing advertisers to be strategic increases the dispersion of PSP adjusted bids, which reduces the minimum number of advertisers needed for the Pigovian tax to increase advertiser profits.
We first show that advertisers choose to submit their highest-value ad for SP and their highest adjusted-value ad for PSP. Consequently, we can apply results from the previous sections if we substitute the distribution of values of the highest-value ads (per advertiser) for the distribution of advertisers' values for ads, and we substitute the distribution of adjusted bids of the highest adjusted-bid ads (per advertiser) for the distribution of adjusted bids.
Finally, we discuss how the substituted distributions can vary from the distributions used for the earlier results, affecting dispersion and hence advertiser profitability, when advertisers choose ads based on the auction type.
Let us begin with new notation that is summarized in Table 3 . We will continue to use i to index advertisers, and we will also use j to index an advertiser's ads. Let v ij be the value to advertiser i for showing their ad j. Let z ij be the ad's impact on user experience, and let a ij = v ij − z ij be the ad's adjusted bid. For an advertiser i, let j * index the ad with maximum value and letj index an ad with maximum adjusted bid.
The following two lemmas outline how advertisers select which ad to submit based on the auction type. We assume advertisers' ad values and impacts on user experience are Proof. This is a proof by contradiction. Suppose advertiser i submits an ad j that has less than the maximum value among advertiser i's ads: v ij < v * ij , and that maximizes their expected profit. Instead, the advertiser could submit a maximum-value ad and use the same bid as the advertiser used for ad j. Since the advertiser uses the same bid, their probability of winning and price if they win are the same. But if they win, then they receive v * ij − v ij > 0 more value.
Lemma 2 For the PSP auction, each advertiser maximizes their expected profit by submitting a highest adjusted-bid ad from the advertiser's set of ads, assuming the advertiser
has an ad with positive adjusted bid.
Proof. We will also prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose advertiser i submits an ad j that has a ij < a ij , bids b, and that maximizes the advertiser's expected profit. Instead, the advertiser could submit adj and bid b − z ij + z ij . The advertiser would have the same
So the advertiser would have the same probability of winning the auction. Let s be the adjusted bid for the second-place offer, or zero if that adjusted bid is negative. If the advertiser wins with ad j, then their profit
If the advertiser won with adj, then their profit would be
Since a ij > a ij , profit would be greater using adj than ad j.
We now prove a theorem that is similar to Theorem 1, but which applies to strategic advertisers choosing from a set of ads. As in previous sections, let w and s index the winning and second-place advertisers for SP, and letw ands index the winning and second-place advertisers for PSP. As shown in Table 3, 
The constant increases. This corresponds to a scenario in which advertisers who rely on ad nuisance for ad effectiveness are less likely to be able to maintain ad effectiveness while decreasing nuisance.
CONCLUSION
This article examined an auction mechanism that charges advertisers a Pigovian tax for the economic costs to the publisher of ad annoyance. The Pigovian second price auction (PSP) adds a charge to the second price (SP) auction for the costs of negative ad impact on viewer experience to the publisher and selects among bids that are adjusted for this charge. The charge is analogous to a Pigovian tax because advertisers internalize the costs of negative ad impact on viewer experience.
While PSP can align advertiser and viewer incentives, a platform may be hesitant to implement it because the Pigovian charge may decrease the profits of its advertisers. But this not need be the case. This article analyzed conditions for PSP to reduce ad annoyance without reducing expected advertiser profits.
We developed a general model of the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff. One advantage of the model is that it imposes minimal assumptions on the joint distribution of advertiser valuations and nuisance costs. Properties of order statistics were applied to compare the outcomes of PSP and SP.
We found that when enough advertisers are willing to bid for an ad slot, PSP can improve the quality of ads without reducing expected advertiser profits. When PSP benefits advertisers, then the platform's own expected profits and the viewer experience also improve.
We also discussed how the model can assess long-term outcomes as advertisers develop ads that are more effective and less annoying, and found that when advertisers can strategically select ads in response to the auction type, this reduces the number of advertisers required for PSP to improve the marketplace.
We also showed how to estimate how many advertisers must bid for PSP to simultaneously improve viewer experience, platform profits, and advertiser profits. For example, when the underlying distributions of the effectiveness-nuisance model are characterized through linked normal distributions, as presented in Section 4.2, a Z-score statistic can be used to estimate the minimum number of advertisers required to implement PSP to the benefit of the marketplace. The Z-score varies with advertiser valuations, ad nuisance costs, and the association between them. Our findings suggest that platforms should implement the Pigovian tax for competitive ad slots that consistently attract a large group of bidders, rather than for ad slots with thinner markets.
We outline two avenues for future research. The first is to examine the implications of implementing PSP under platform competition. Since we found that the advertisers of a single platform benefit from PSP when there are enough bidders, suppose that only the most competitive platforms initially adopt PSP, while smaller platforms with fewer advertisers do not. Since PSP profitably improves viewer experience and attracts the best advertisers, then, for the larger platforms, switching to PSP would expand their lead over smaller competitors, and advertisers would face greater incentives to improve their ads. The marketplace dynamics of platform competition may also be influenced by long-run objectives such as growing the viewer base or discouraging viewers from adopting ad blocking technologies.
The second avenue is to investigate the role of ad annoyance that is controlled by platforms rather than advertisers. For example, some platforms choose to sell ad formats that are obtrusive to viewers but can sell at higher prices. In the long run, this strategy may encourage more consumers to adopt ad-blocking technologies that pose an even greater threat to platform profits than the nuisance costs of annoying ads.
We conclude by emphasizing the importance and urgency of researching how to address the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff, a challenge for monetizing digital advertising. Managing this tradeoff is especially critical in the growing industry of mobile display advertising, in which ads can interfere with user experience because of lower bandwidths and smaller screens.
As Forbes magazine observes, "users find mobile ads invasive and annoying -even more so than desktop ads which are easier to tune out. And as Facebook sees its user growth and engagement slow (particularly with younger users looking elsewhere) it needs to be careful not to do anything to hasten the exits" (Kosner 2012). Viewers in the mobile market have more leverage because they drive app adoption and are more likely to generate content for others to view. Similarly, hardware platforms are also sensitive to negative ad impact, and have even banned some apps (or their advertisements) based on negative impact on viewer experience. For example, Apple initially prohibited all ads on some popular apps including
YouTube to encourage adoption of the iPad (Efrati 2012), and more recently Apple released an iOS9 operating system that allows ad-blocking software.
This study illustrated how to sustainably manage the effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff of online display ads through a Pigovian pricing mechanism. Promoting a better ad experience for users may be part of a sustainable solution, avoiding a cat-and-mouse game of increasingly sophisticated ad blockers chasing increasingly sophisticated ways to embed ads in content or have ads masquerade as content. We hope our findings encourage future work on how to improve monetization through digital display ads in ways that improve the digital experience for viewers.
APPENDIX A: Proof of Theorem 1
Let r(x 1 , x 2 ) = max(x 1 , 0)−max(x 2 , 0). Then the advertiser profit from PSP is r(aw, as), and the advertiser profit from SP is r(v w , v s ). To prove the theorem, we will show that
To begin, we will transform E {r(v w , v s )} and E {r(aw, as)} into integrals that are easy to compare. By definition, E {r(v w , v s )} =ˆ∞
where q(x 1 , x 2 ) is the joint pdf for the maximum (x 1 ) and runner up (x 2 ) among n i.i.d.
samples from a distribution having pdf f and cdf F . Since there are n 2 ways to choose the top two samples and 2 ways to choose which is the maximum, q(x 1 , x 2 ) = 2 n 2 F (x 2 ) n−2 f (x 1 )f (x 2 ).
Substitute into Equation 29:
E {r(v w , v s )} =ˆ∞
Use two changes of variables: u 1 = F (x 1 ) and u 2 = F (x 2 ). Since r(F −1 (u 1 ), F −1 (u 2 ))p(u 1 , u 2 ) du 1 du 2 .
Applying the same process to E {r(aw, as)}, but with variable substitutions u 1 = G(x 1 ) and
E {r(aw, as)} =ˆ1 [r(G −1 (u 1 ), G −1 (u 2 )) − r(F −1 (u 1 ), F −1 (u 2 ))]p(u 1 , u 2 ) du 1 du 2 .
Split the integral based on whether u 2 ≥û:
[r(G −1 (u 1 ), G −1 (u 2 )) − r(F −1 (u 1 ), F −1 (u 2 ))]p(u 1 , u 2 ) du 1 du 2 (38)
Call the first double integral I and the second double integral II. First, we will show that I can be made arbitrarily close to zero by selecting n sufficiently large. Then we will show that II is positive.
Note that I ≥ P r {u 2 ≤û} min u 2 ≤û,u 1 ≥u 2
Recall that E {u 2 } = n−1 n+1
, and u 2 ∈ [0, 1]. By Markov's Inequality, P r {u 2 ≤û} = P r {1 − u 2 ≥ 1 −û} ≤ E {1 − u 2 } 1 −û = 2 n+1 1 −û .
Sinceû < 1, 1 −û > 0. So we can make P r {u 2 ≤û} arbitrarily close to zero by choosing n sufficiently large. To show that we can make I arbitrarily close to zero, we also need to show that min u 2 ≤û,u 1 ≥u 2
is finite.
To do that, consider two cases: u 1 ≤û and u 1 >û. Start with u 1 ≤û. First, r(G −1 (u 1 ), G −1 (u 2 )) ≥ 0, because the gap between the maximum and runner-up bids is nonnegative. Second, −r(F −1 (u 1 ), F −1 (u 2 )) ≥ −r(F −1 (û), 0), since u 1 ≤û and min(F −1 (u 2 ), 0) ≥ 0. So r(G −1 (u 1 ), G −1 (u 2 )) − r(F −1 (u 1 ), F −1 (u 2 )) ≥ −r(F −1 (û), 0).
If F −1 (û) ≤ 0, then the RHS is zero. If not, then it is −F −1 (û), which is finite because we assume F −1 (û) < ∞.
For the case u 1 >û,
The reasoning from the previous case (u 1 ≤û) applies to the first square-bracketed term, so it is finite. For the second square-bracketed term,
because G −1 (û) ≥ 0, F −1 (û) ≥ 0, and u 1 >û. We will show that
Consider the integralˆF
By the definition of a cdf, this integral equals u 1 −û. Alternatively, perform a change of variables to u = F (x), with du = f (x) dx : 
Since s is selected without reference to z i values,
So, by the linearity of expectation,
So we need to show that E {vs − zs} ≥ (1 − cθ)E {v s } − (1 − θ)µ y .
Let
Since the mapping from v i − z i to α i preserves ordering, the runner-up α i corresponds to the runner-up v i − z i . So we need to show that
Note that
So the distribution of α i has the same mean as that of v i and a greater variance.
We need to show that the second order statistic for a normal distribution is at least the second order statistic for another normal distribution that has the same mean and a lower variance. For n > 3, this is true because an order statistic in the upper half of the sample has a higher mean for the higher-variance normal simply because higher variance makes higher values more likely. For n = 3, it is true because the mean of the second order statistic is the same as the mean of the distributions: µ v . To see this, note that any set of three sample values from a distribution that is symmetric about its mean has the same likelihood as the set of reflections of the three values across the mean. But the reflected runner up is the runner up of the reflected sample set, and it is on the opposite side of the mean and equally distant from it. So the two runner ups average to the mean of the distribution.
